题目：Are Founder Directors Detrimental to New Ventures at Initial Public Offering?
主讲人：王唐
Institute for Entrepreneurship and Innovation, University of Missouri-Kansas City
时间：2011.12.9，下午2点至4点
地点：综合楼302室

交流内容简介：Firms at initial public offering (IPO) need to undergo a number of changes to their organizational system, necessitating external resources, commitment to the firm, and market legitimacy. Applying resource dependency theory, we contend that a higher ratio of founders on the board of directors will decrease IPO performance. In addition, we explore the moderating effects of governance and ownership structures (original chief executive officer (CEO) retention, venture capitalist (VC) on the board, and founder directors' ownership) for a more context-specific examination of board composition. We employ a unique sample of 274 Chinese new venture IPOs over the period 2004 to 2009 to test our hypotheses. Several surprising results are revealed that challenge traditional views. First, if the firm is managed by a non-original CEO, the relationship between the founder-board ratio and IPO price premium is an inverse U shape; otherwise, the presence of founder directors has no impact on IPO performance. Second, if a VC sits on the board, the presence of founder directors has a linear positive effect on IPO performance; otherwise, the inverse U-shaped relationship still holds. These findings contribute to the literature of founder management and board composition in new ventures under emerging economies.